Relative to most other European countries the United Kingdom enjoys a secure, positive memory of World War 2. At its simplest, the narrative goes: the Germans started it and the British, with their allies, won. However damaging to British relations with other European states since , this account has proved remarkably durable 1. Within this serene landscape, the combined bombing offensive against Germany, and specifically the part played by Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force RAF , form an exception.
Memories of Bomber Command are unusual in being both complex and volatile. A cohesive national myth of the bombing campaign, comparable for example to the British myth of the Blitz, the German bombing of British cities in 4 , is impossible.
Memories of the bombing offensive, moreover, are volatile because they have shown significant variance over time. The nature of the offensive can be summarised in two sets of figures. First, approximately , men served as Bomber Command aircrew, Of these, 47, were killed in action or died while prisoners of war; a further 8, were killed in accidents; 8, returned home wounded; and 9,, many of them also wounded, became prisoners of war.
Thus 59 per cent of all who served became casualties, including 47 per cent killed 5. As some of the most highly-trained men in the armed services, aircrew were well placed to know their chances; but all were volunteers. More troubling, secondly, are the casualties that Bomber Command inflicted. The Allies dropped some 2. Just over half the total was aimed at Germany, one-fifth at France, and one-seventh at Italy 6.
Civilian deaths in Germany from Allied bombing were estimated at over , in the post-war decades. Even the more recent estimate of , remains very high 7. To these should be added 60, or more Italian dead and a minimum of 57, for France 8 , plus several thousands for smaller countries including Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Bulgaria.
